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RECENT DECISIONS
Bn.Ls .AND NoTBs-DrsCHARGE-lNrmm:oNAL DEsTRuC'.l'ION DuE TO Mrs•
TAKE AS A DrsCHARGE-The holder of sixteen bonds issued by defendant
destroyed the bonds believing them to be worthless after they had been in
default as to both principal and interest for six years. Ten years later the
defendant went into bankruptcy for reorganization and the holder learned that
under the plan of reorganization the bonds were exchangeable for $400 in cash
and $600 in preferred stock. When defendant refused to recognize the
indebtedness even though the holder tendered an indemnity bond against
wrongful payment, the holder instituted suit to recover the value of the bonds.
The lower court denied relief to the plaintiff.1 On appeal, held, affirmed.
Intentional destruction of a negotiable instrument is the highest evidence of
an intention to discharge and cancel the debt represented by it. State Street
Trust Co. v. Muskogee Electric Traction Co., (10th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d)
920.
One of the ways in which a negotiable instrument can be discharged, as
set forth in subdivision 3 of section 119 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
is by the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder. This form of discharge cannot be read apart from section 123, which states that "a cancellation
made unintentionally, or under mistake . . . is inoperative." It would seem
that this limits section 119(3) to the extent that a cancellation might be made
intentionally but under a mistake.2 The court in the principal case in applying
the same provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law3 reaches the conclusion that there was no mistake within the meaning of section 123 and that
there was an intentional cancellation within the meaning of section 119(3).
The court defined mistake as being some unintentional act arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence.4 But by defining mistake
as an unintentional act the first part of section 123 can then have no meaning
1 After the institution of the suit, the plaintiff was substituted as conservator of the
holder's estate.
2 HuMBLE, LAw oii BILLS AND NoTEs 206 (1939).
8 Okla. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 48, §§261(3), 265. For annotations of these two sections
in other states see 5 U.L.A., part 2, pp. 476, 583 (1943). The proposed Uniform Com·
mercial Code provides for cancellation and renunciation in §3-605: "(I) The holder of an
instrument may even without consideration discharge any party (a) by intentionally cancelling the instrument or the party's signature ••• or by writing 'cancelled' or equivalent
words across the instrument or against the signature; or (b) by renouncing his rights by a
signed writing or by surrender of the instrument to the party to be discharged. (2) Neither
cancellation nor renunciation without surrender of the instrument affects the title thereto."
This is intended to encompass what was previously in NIL §§48, 119(3), 120(2), 122,
123. Except for the latter section, the other sections have been merely reworded and combined; §123 is omitted entirely. A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDB OFFICIAL DRAFT,
texts and comments ed., 423-424 (1952). It is doubtful that the changes in the Uniform
Commercial Code with respect to §119(3) and the omission of §123 would affect the
problem in the principal case. It still does not clarify the meaning of intentional cancellation, and the reason §123 was omitted is that it states a rule applicable to any discharge and
the drafters therefore felt it unnecessary to state with special reference to cancellation. Id.
at 424.
4 Principal case at 923, quoting from 27 WoRDs AND PHRASES 365 (1940).
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except to restate section 119(3). It would seem that the drafters of the
Negotiable Instruments Law by specifically using the disjunctive "or" in section
123 had in mind two different acts: (1) unintentional cancellation and (2)
intentional cancellation made under a mistake. Thus, if a note is cancelled
in the belief that it is fully paid but as a matter of fact it is not fully paid,
though the act of cancellation may be said to be intentional, the debtor is not
released.5 If mistake means this much, then it would seem that it would
include the mistaken belief in the principal case.
Historically, the destruction of a negotiable instrument by the owner not
only extinguished the paper but the underlying debt and all other legal relations connected with it.6 From this it has been reasoned that in determining
whether there has been an intentional cancellation, the purpose or intent of
the holder beyond the intent to destroy is immaterial.7 But again section
119(3) must be read along with the latter part of section 123, which in effect
says that a holder may rebut the inference of intentional cancellation by
proving that it was done unintentionally. Thus, it can be said that an intentional destruction or mutilation of the instrument might very well set up
a presumption of cancellation, but it is a rebuttable presumption which can
be overcome by showing that the holder had a different state of mind. 8 The
usual state of mind that the courts look for in section 119(3) is an intention
to forgive the indebtedness or to make a gift of the indebtedness to the principal debtor.9 Nevertheless, the court in the principal case expanded this
meaning by holding that the intentional destruction by the holder evidenced
an intention to forgive the obligation in the sense of forgetting it or wiping
it out.10 It is not clear why the court felt the necessity to expand the usual
meaning in order to bring the case within section 119(3). It cannot be
because the defendant relied on the holder's action, for the defendant never
knew of the bonds' destruction and had carried them on its books and included
them in its reorganization plan.11 Nor can it be because of fear of loss to the
defendant through a future claim in case the bonds were not really destroyed;
Ii Banks v. Marshall, 23 Cal. 223 (1863); Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 129
Mass. 438 (1880); Morris v. Reyman, 55 Ind. App. 112, 103 N.E. 423 (1913). See
Fitzgerald v. Nelson, 159 Ore. 264, 79 P. (2d) 254 (1938).
6 BRl'l.ToN, BILLS AND NOT.Es 1045 (1943). Cancellation without destruction of the
instrument is thought of as a constructive destruction of the instrument. Ibid. The early
English common law also held that a material alteration discharged the underlying debt.
Id. at 1082.
7 McDonald v. Loomis, 233 Mich. 174 at 183, 206 N.W. 348 (1925); Booth v.
Smith, 3 Woods (5th Cir.) 19, 3 Fed. Cas. 881, No. 1645 (1876).
s In re Lock's Will, 187 Misc. 535, 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 206 (1946).
9 Thus, in Norton v. Smith, 130 Me. 58, 153 A. 886 (1931), where the holder
destroyed the note, the admitted evidence showed that the destruction was actually done
with the intent to forgive the obligation. For cases where the destruction of the instrument
was done with intention to make a gift to the debtor see 37 A.L.R. 1148 (1925); 84 A.L.R.
385 (1935).
10 Principal case at 922.
11 It is therefore a different situation where the holder renounces his rights under the
instrument by either surrendering it to the obligor or by a written declaration of renuncia·
tion. NIL §122. See BRI'J.TON, BILLS AND NOT.Es 1047 (1943); OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE
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the holder had offered to indemnify the defendant against this possible liability.12 The court felt that in order to give meaning to the explicit words
of the statute, the words "intentional cancellation (or destruction)" had to
be interpreted to include an intention to forget or wipe out. But other courts
have interpreted the meaning to be cancellation with intention to forgive or
make a gift of the obligation.13 It is believed that the latter is the most
natural meaning, since economic self-interest makes it unlikely that a holder
will cancel with a mere intention to forget or wipe out a debt, whereas it is
not unlikely that he may do so with a benevolent intent. By expanding the
meaning of intentional cancellation in the principal case, the court has departed from the usual and most natural meaning of the words in a situation
where such departure seems clearly unwarranted, thereby giving the defendant
a windfall it would otherwise not have received.14

Richard S. Weinstein, S.Ed.

INSTRUMENTS,

5th ed., 466 (1947); Copp v. Van Vleck, 104 N.J. Eq. 129, 144 A. 450

(1929).
12 The Negotiable Instruments Law does not provide for an indemnity bond, but most
states require one where the maker demands it. OGDEN, NEGOTIAllLE INsTRUMENTS, 5th
ed., 522 (1947); 129 A.L.R. 977 (1940).
13 Note 9 supra.
14 The dissenting judge argued that the statute was designed to prevent frauds, not to
perpetrate them. Principal case at 924.

